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Abstract
Humans flexibly solve new problems that differ qualitatively from those they
were trained on. This ability to generalize is supported by learned concepts that
capture structure common across different problems. Here we develop a naturalistic
drawing task to study how humans rapidly acquire structured prior knowledge.
The task requires drawing visual objects that share underlying structure, based on
a set of composable geometric rules. We show that people spontaneously learn
abstract drawing procedures that support generalization, and propose a model
of how learners can discover these reusable drawing programs. Trained in the
same setting as humans, and constrained to produce efficient motor actions, this
model discovers new drawing routines that transfer to test objects and resemble
learned features of human sequences. These results suggest that two principles
guiding motor program induction in the model - abstraction (general programs
that ignore object-specific details) and compositionality (recombining previously
learned programs) - are key for explaining how humans learn structured internal
representations that guide flexible reasoning and learning.
1 Introduction
A long-term goal of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is to build machines that can quickly learn to solve
qualitatively new problems. Inspiration may be gained from humans, who readily solve many kinds
of tasks without extensive supervision or experience, such as understanding the meaning of new
words, or rapidly learning new video games [1]. These abilities are partly supported by learned
internal models, or inductive biases, the structure of which captures regularities useful for reasoning
about new situations (e.g., real-world object categories and their relations, or causal rules in video
games) [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. In this work we adopt a scientific goal, rather than an engineering goal: to
probe diagnostic elements of how humans acquire structured prior knowledge, and to understand it in
computational terms.
To study such learning in a controlled setting, we introduce a drawing task to probe rapid, few-shot
updating of structured internal models after brief experience. On its surface, the task is simple:
to copy, by drawing, a series of novel visual objects. However, how people draw provides rich
insight into their internal representations and prior knowledge. This is intuitive when one considers
the inherent ambiguity in how even simple line-drawings should be copied. How do different line
segments group into coherent objects? How are those objects related? Drawing is therefore a window
into how reasoning and problem-solving is guided by structured prior knowledge, including concepts
as diverse as geometry, real-world objects, and geological formations [8, 9, 10, 4, 11, 12, 13]. For
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Figure 1: Background and overview. (A) Prior knowledge influences how people draw. Consider how
one might draw the object on top. Drawing tends to differ depending on what structural description
is associated with the object - "Diamond with a cross-line" vs. "Pyramid and its reflection" [8]. (B)
Representative tasks in Training sets 1 and 2, and in the common Test set. (C) Hypothesized behavior
on test tasks that would be diagnostic of learned abstract structure.
example, consider copying the object in Figure 1A. The order of strokes people use to copy this
object depends whether it is described as a “diamond with a cross-line” or an “Egyptian pyramid and
its reflection on water” (Figure 1A) [8].
How prior knowledge guiding drawing is learned has been the subject of descriptive studies of
drawing behavior across children and adults (e.g., [13, 8, 9, 14]). Other studies have described
single-session learning of specific objects, such as cubes or prisms (e.g., [15, 16]). Our goal is to
extend prior studies by combining a focus on learning that is rapid and generalizable with a formal
computational account of this rapid learning.
Motivated by prior empirical and theoretical studies (and supported post hoc by behavior in this
study), we model learning by incorporating two key principles: abstraction and compositionality.
Abstract refers to higher-order structure that is independent of object-specific features. In principle,
this supports reasoning that is flexible even in novel situations that differ in lower-level features; e.g.,
the concept of repeat can apply to any simple drawn object [7, 17, 3, 18, 19]. Compositional refers to
complex concepts learned by combining simpler conceptual building blocks. E.g., repeat and hexagon
can be combined to draw an object along the perimeter of an imaginary hexagon. Compositionality
gives complexity and variation that extrapolates beyond direct training experience [5, 20, 7, 21, 17].
Our model realizes abstraction and compositionality through program induction. Concretely, it learns
to synthesize abstract, compositional graphics programs from the same visual stimuli given to human
subjects, drawing on recent neuro-symbolic program induction algorithms [22, 23].
Our behavioral data provides evidence that humans indeed perform few-shot updating of their
inductive biases by learning program-like drawing procedures that guide generalization. We describe
a program-induction algorithm that discovers new abstract, compositional, drawing routines given the
same limited training data given to humans. Moreover, the model’s learned drawing behavior captures
certain diagnostic features of how humans generalize. These results suggest that abstraction and
compositionality are key principles for explaining how humans rapidly learn program-like structure
that guides reasoning and planning in drawing.
2 A neuro-symbolic model for learning compositional drawing programs
Our model is inspired by prior approaches modeling handwriting and drawing [24, 25, 10], AI models
that learn structured inductive biases in other cognitive domains [26, 27, 17, 28], and models of
perception as inference of symbolic descriptions [29, 19, 30, 19, 31, 32]. We model drawing behavior
based on programs, or symbolic procedures representing a description of a drawing’s parts–here,
simple primitives such as lines and circles–and higher-order relations - e.g., repetition and hierarchy.
For a given image, the model infers how to draw it by performing probabilistic inference over a space
of drawing programs. Learning works by estimating a prior over programs in a hierarchical Bayesian
fashion. Estimating this prior involves inducing new drawing subroutines that are useful for multiple
drawing tasks, effectively caching and reusing motor program schemas. These learned subroutines
are abstract and compositional. Finally, for comparison with human behavior, we convert these
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programs into low-level motor actions. This conversion rests on a third principle relevant for action
planning–motor efficiency–which is formalized by modeling a proxy for motor costs.
Overall Model
L
ρn
In Q
L: library
(generative model)
ρn: program
In: image
Q: neural net
(recognition model)
Explore: Infer ρn
L
ρn
In
max P (In|ρ)P (ρ|L)
for Q(ρ|In) large
Q
Compile: Train Q
L
ρ
I
ρ
I
· · ·
· · ·
ρn
In︸ ︷︷ ︸
dreams
︸ ︷︷ ︸
replays
training data: cyan (I, ρ)
max logQ(ρ|I)
Compress: Update L
L
ρn
In
argmaxL of
P (L)
∏
n P (ρn|L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
iterative 3-step inference procedure
Figure 2: The Bayesian neurosymbolic program induction algorithm that underlies our computational
model, based on [23, 33]. Left (“overall model”): Each observed image In is explained using a latent
program ρn. The prior or inductive bias is modeled by an inventory or “library” of learned primitives,
L. A neural network recognition model (red arrows) learns to map from images to a distribution over
source code of programs likely to explain that image. Conditional distribution output by the network
is notated Q(·|·). Inference iterates through Explore, which searches programs ordered under Q and
rescores them under true posterior P (·|L, In); Compile, which trains the neural network Q to search
for image-explaining programs, training both on replays of programs from Explore and “dreams,”
or samples from the learned prior; and Compress, which updates the prior by compressing out new
compositional code abstractions which are incorporated into the library L.
Program-Induction Model We treat drawing as Bayesian inference over the most likely program
ρ that generated each image. Programs are sampled from a generative model defined by a library of
primitives L (models are initialized with the library in Table 1) . The model recovers ρ maximizing:
P (ρ|I, L) ∝ P (I|ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood: 1[ρ draws I]
× P (ρ|L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
description-length prior
(1)
For test images we relax the likelihood function to pixel-wise L2 distance; see Suppl. Sect. 1.2.
The model learns from experience drawing. Given training images {In}Nn=1 the model updates its
library L by searching to maximize:
P (L| {In}Nn=1) ∝ P (L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
description-length prior
×
N∏
n=1
∑
ρ
P (In|ρ)P (ρ|L) (2)
Equations 1 and 2 are intractable, because they require computing the infinite set of all possible
programs. We approximate inference using an iterative approach based on the DreamCoder program
synthesis algorithm (Figure 2, Suppl. Sect 1; see [23, 33]). This alternates between inferring a
program for each image (Explore), updating the library L with discovered subroutines used across
program solutions (Compress), and training a neural network, Q(ρ|I), to predict a probability
distribution over programs ρ likely to explain image I (Compile). Learned subroutines can be
abstract (e.g., taking as input arbitrary parameters or subprograms).
Converting programs to motor trajectories Programs ρ are structural descriptions that do not
represent ordering of strokes. For example, a program that translates a vertical line four times could
correspond to either a left-to-right or a right-to-left drawing sequence. Thus, we “ground” these
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programs into possible motor trajectories t, defined for model and humans as an ordered list of
segmented “strokes”, each stroke summarized by a feature vector (see “Analysis of behavior”). Each
program ρ generates a set of admissible t, which includes all trajectories whose stroke-sequence can
be aligned with the program’s syntax tree.
The probability of t given program ρ in the program induction (PI) model is therefore given by:
P (t|ρ) = 1 [t admissible for ρ]∑
t′ 1 [t
′ admissible for ρ]
(3)
Table 1: Starting primitives in library L. Model learns an inductive bias over programs by inducing
new subroutines that are built out of these primitives.
Primitive Arg. types1 Returns Description
line none D Line with endpoints at (0,0) and (1,0)
circle none D Unit circle centered at (0,0)
repeat (D, n, T ) D Drawing transformed by T n times
transform (D, T ) D Applies affine transformation T
reflect (D, θ) D Reflects across axis defined by θ
connect (D, D) D Union of two drawings
affine (d, d, θ, s, o) T Translation (d, d), rotation (θ), scaling (s) in order o
Reweighting motor trajectories by motor cost Drawing is influenced by a variety of motor
constraints [13, 10, 8, 24]. To bias the model toward efficient trajectories, we assign to each trajectory
a score summarizing motor efficiency based on the statistics of human movement trajectories.
All possible motor trajectory permutations t for a given program p are assigned a motor cost. We
define a feature extractor φ(·) that maps a trajectory t to a trajectory-level real-valued feature vector
φ(t) with four elements based a priori on known drawing biases [24, 8]: start (position of first stroke
relative to top-left corner), distance (total movement distance), direction (direction of movements
relative to the diagonal), and verticality (bias for vertical transitions) (see details in Suppl. Sect 2.2).
Given an input image I , the model predicts a drawing trajectory t with probability
P (t|I) = 1 [t draws I] exp (−θ · φ(t))∑
t′ 1 [t
′ draws I] exp (−θ · φ(t′)) (4)
for weight-vector θ, where θ · φ(t) is the cost of trajectory t. Given a set of N training images
{In}Nn=1 and paired motor trajectories {tsn}Nn=1 for subject s, the model estimates for each subject θs
via regularized maximum likelihood,
θs = argmin
θs
N∑
n=1
− logP (tsn|Isn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
depends on θs; Eq. 4
+λ||θs||22 (5)
with a suitable coefficient of regularization λ.
Finally, in the full model (i.e., “Hybrid”; see below) trajectories t for program p from the Program
Induction model were reweighted using the Motor Cost model:
P (t|ρ, θgen) = 1 [t admissible for ρ] exp(−θ
gen · φ(t))∑
t′ 1 [t
′ admissible for ρ] exp(−θgen · φ(t′)) (6)
Where θgen = 1S
∑S
s=1 θ
s is a set of general parameters averaged across all subjects.
Lesioned models The full model (HM) was compared to “lesioned” models in Table 2.
1Types: D is a drawing (set of ink coordinates); N , θ, d, s, o are discretized parameters drawn from a
multinomial distribution
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Table 2: Models used in this study
Model Training set Abbrev. Description
Null none Null All trajectories, equal probability
Motor Cost 1, 2 (motor data) MC1, MC2 All traj., w/group-specific cost
Program Induction 1, 2 (images) PI1, PI2 Admissible traj., all equal probability
Hybrid 1, 2 (mot. & im.) HM1, HM2 Admissible traj., w/across-group cost
Figure 3: Single-session learning of structure in drawings. (A) Example drawing trajectories for two
subjects (columns) on four test tasks (rows). Stroke order is indicated by both color (purple to yellow)
and the number in grey dot. Grey dots also indicate start positions. (B) Example segmentations.
Letter codes indicate stroke categories. (C) Stroke transitions were directionally biased. (D) MC
feature weights for behavior on Test stimuli. Positive corresponds to a bias for transitions that are
vertical, towards bottom-right, low distance, and for first stroke at top-left. *, **, p<.05, .005, t-test.
3 Experiments
3.1 Methods
The drawing task Humans and models copy visually-presented objects defined by simple objects
and composed geometric rules (Figure 1). Humans were randomly split into two groups whose
training sets differed in higher-order structure. Generalization was tested on a single common set of
tasks. Therefore, differences in behavior on test stimuli are attributable to learning on the training
sets.
Subjects Subjects [N = 104 (58 M, 44 F, 2 excluded due to incorrect copying of the objects or
errors in saving data), Age = 35.0 +/- 9.3 (mean/SD)] were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk
and paid $3.00 for 15-20 minutes. Subjects gave informed consent. The study was approved by our
institution’s Institutional Review Board.
Stimuli See examples in Figure 1C. Two sets of stimuli were generated using different probabilistic
algorithms. Both had repeated vertical lines (2, 3, or 4), but differed in the other components. Set
1 had vertically grouped strokes (lines and circles) superimposed on the vertical lines, while Set
2 had horizontally-oriented groups of strokes, sampled from an library of objects (e.g. dumbbells
(o–o), lollipops (–o) and poles (—)). We randomly generated 250 stimuli for each training set, from
which we manually selected 36 representative samples. The common Test set included 18 manually
designed ambiguous images.
Procedure The experiment was presented in a web browser using PsiTurk [34] on a touchscreen
device (phone, tablet, or laptops). The instructions read: You will learn to write letters from an
alphabet of an alien civilization recently discovered by astronauts. Scientists would like to study how
people learn to write new alphabets. Your task is to copy the letters. Try to be quick, but it is also
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important to be accurate! Letters are taken from the same alphabet. But letters get harder over time,
so try to learn from the earlier trials! On each trial a single stimulus was presented top-center of
the screen. The subjects copied it on “sketchpad” directly below the stimulus without explicit time
constraints or evaluative feedback. Subjects first saw seven simple stimuli (e.g the first three stimuli
in Figure 1C), followed by 13 training stimuli of varying difficulty. Next, subjects copied the 18
testing intermixed with the remaining 16 training stimuli, in orders randomized for each subject.
Analysis of behavior Motor trajectories were segmented into discrete strokes, and each stroke was
summarized by a feature vector φstroke = (category, startLocation, center, row, column) (details
in Suppl. Sect 2.1). Each trajectory was defined by an ordered list of strokes: (φ1stroke, φ
2
stroke, ...).
Scoring model-human distance For each combination of test image I , human h, and model m,
we measured the distance between human behavior and model predictions by:
d(h,m, I) =
∑
t′
Damerau–Levenshtein(t′, th)P (t′|ρm, θm) (7)
where the Damerau–Levenshtein edit distance is applied to pairs of trajectories, p is the highest-
scoring program based on the program induction model, and θ are motor cost parameters.
3.2 Human results
Rapid learning of structure in drawings We expected that a behavioral readout of learning would
be for subjects trained on Task 2 (horizontally structured objects) to produce a relatively higher
frequency of horizontal transitions, compared to subjects trained on Task 1 (vertically structured
objects) (Figure 1C). Indeed, we found this to be the case (Figure 3A-C). We confirmed that this
difference in vertical vs. horizontal biases remained even after accounting for other changes to
behavior. We jointly fit parameters describing four different motor features: Start, Distance, Direction,
and Verticality, fit separately for each subject using the Motor Cost model. While we found weak,
but significant, differences in Start and Distance between the two groups, we found a relatively
strong difference in Verticality weights, consistent with the previous analysis of transition frequencies
(Figure 3D). This result further supports that training led to strong apparent biases for vertical vs.
horizontal transitions.
Figure 4: Program-like structure in behavior. Four example subjects depicting each strategy (left),
apparent program-like structure (middle), and frequencies of these strategies for the two training
groups.
Program-like structure in behavior Did differences in vertical and horizontal biases reflect
changes in lower-level motor preferences, or more abstract biases? Consistent with abstraction,
subjects’ qualitative behavior appeared to be well-described by abstract programs (Figure 4). In
particular, four program-like strategies were prominent across subjects. The “skewers” strategy
involved drawing a vertical line, immediately followed by the objects “skewered onto it” (Figure 4,
top row). “Skewers” was used only by Group 1 subjects. Other strategies involved first drawing the
vertical gratings followed by different ways of drawing the smaller objects (Figure 4, rows 2-4). We
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quantitatively assigned one strategy to each subject based on the distribution of Motor Cost model
parameters, extended with two additional parameters capturing biases for (1) perseverating on a given
category of objects (e.g., circle-circle-circle...), and (2) finishing a “skewer” before before moving to
the next one (see Suppl. Sect 2.3). Group 1 and Group 2 subjects tended to use different program-like
strategies (Figure 4, right).
Figure 5: Evidence for abstract gen-
eralization in a followup study with
rotated test stimuli. (A) Test stimuli
are rotated relative to the original
experiment in Figure 3. (B) Exam-
ple drawings for two subjects show-
ing that they retained program-like
biases evident for rotated Test tasks.
(C) Summary analysis. “Vertical
score” is computed as V/(V + H),
where V and H are average vertical
and horizontal transitions per task.
Large dots indicate medians.
Evidence for abstract generalization On a new set of subjects, we performed a modified experi-
ment to further test whether subjects indeed learned abstract programs. We reasoned that abstract
programs should persist if the Test stimuli were rotated (Figure 5A). However, if subjects learn only
the horizontal vs. vertical motor biases, we would expect this bias to remain unchanged. We found
that directional biases changed orientation when the test stimuli were rotated (Figure 5B,C). In the
original experiment subjects in Group 1 exhibited a stronger vertical bias than those in Group 2 during
Training, and this effect carried over to Testing (replotted in Figure 5C). However, in the modified
experiment, while Group 1 subjects still exhibited a stronger vertical bias during training, they
preferred horizontal transitions when tested on rotated stimuli (Figure 5C). This flexible adaptation of
directional biases in a manner that mimics the orientation of the stimuli is consistent with the learning
of abstract programs.
3.3 Modeling results
Program induction We trained a pair of models on either Training sets 1 (HM1) or 2 (HM2),
initialized with the primitives in Table 2 (some drawn in Figure 6A). The models successfully learned
new program subroutines (examples in Figure 6B). This was reflected in unconditioned samples
from learned priors (i.e., “dreams”), which exhibited different, task-related structure, such as vertical
“skewers” for Model 1 and horizontal “barbells” for Model 2. Some dreams also extrapolated from
the training stimuli (Figure 6D). Untrained models did not exhibit task-related dreams (Figure 6D,
“Baseline”). Trained models performed well on the test tasks [mean/SD of 1.9/1.7 (HM1) and
0.35/0.76 (HM2) mistakes (missed or extra strokes) per task (out of 11.6)]; in contrast, the untrained
model was unable to solve the test tasks. Moreover, the two trained models often produced different
solutions to the same task, coarsely resembling solutions produced by trained humans (Figure 6C).
Comparison with humans We quantified the similarity between humans and models, finding that
Human group 1 was better fit by HM1 than by HM2, and Human group 2 was better fit by HM2 than
by HM1, indicating that learning altered the structure of behavior for both humans and models in
overlapping ways (Figure 6E). We also compared HM1 and HM2 to alternative “lesioned” models
(see Methods and Table 2). HM modeled humans better than did Program Induction alone (PI),
consistent with significant contribution of motor biases. Moreover, HM performed better than a
model with learned motor biases but without program induction (MC), indicating an important role
of abstract program-like structure in learning. As an upper bound, we assessed the similarity of
humans to other humans in the same Training group (Figure 6E). Not surprisingly, compared to this
upper bound, the HM model did not capture all complexities of human behavior. This is partly due
to human drawing being influenced by a variety of biases which we did not attempt to model (see
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Figure 6: Modeling results. (A) Example starting primitives (left) and drawings (right). s, n and
t are variables representing drawings, natural number, and transformation (see Methods). (B) Ex-
ample subroutines learned by both PI1 and PI2 (Bi), PI1 only (Bii), and PI2 only (Biii). (C) On an
example test task, solutions by models (top) and example humans (bottom). (D) Example “dreams,”
or prior samples at Baseline, and after training on Tasks 1 (Model 1) or 2 (Model 2).(E) Compar-
ing human and model behavior on test tasks. Similarity = mean(D(H1,M2), D(H2,M1)) −
mean(D(H1,M1), D(H2,M2)), where D(H ′,M ′) = 1Nh
1
Ns
∑
h∈H′
∑
s dist(h,M
′, Is) is dis-
tance to model averaged over humans (h) and test stimuli (s). *, **, p<.05, .005; #, p=.06, paired
t-test. Null model p<.05 vs. other models.
Discussion). This result argues that a model like ours, trained on a small dataset and without access
to human data, captures diagnostic features of human generalization.
4 Discussion
We show that humans learn new abstract program-like structure from brief training on drawing
tasks, and with no explicit instruction. To understand this learning computationally, we built a
generative model combined with a learning algorithm formalizing the principles of abstraction,
compositionality, and motor efficiency. Trained on the same data as humans, this model learned a
new set of abstract drawing subroutines by recombining a small set of simple drawing primitives.
These learned subroutines support generalization behavior that resembles important aspects of human
drawings in this task. Our results suggest that principles of abstraction and compositionality are
central to explaining how humans learn generalizable program-like structure in drawing.
We formalize learning as acquisition of parsimonious internal models that explain shared structure
underlying multiple learning experiences. The idea of knowledge as efficient abstraction has parallels
in philosophy (e.g. Occam’s razor), psychology [35]), and cognitive modeling (e.g. hierarchical
Bayesian accounts of learning-to-learn [36, 24, 7] ). Our computational approach to learning builds
on this work, by representing concepts as generative programs, and inductive biases as priors over
programs [37, 38, 26, 27, 24].
One limitation of our study is that stimuli were relatively simple and “clean.” This was by design, as
we focus less on real-world writing or drawing skill (e.g., [24]) but on abstraction in rapid learning.
Second, we did not attempt to capture the full complexity of drawing, which likely contributes to the
diversity of behavior across people. Future work may attempt to model this diversity as differences in
starting priors (e.g., related to perception, motor skill, art and writing experience, and others).
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Recent deep-learning-based models have had success modeling drawing and handwriting on more
complex concepts than considered here. However, in contrast to our model, they need significantly
larger training data-sets, in some cases supervision with human motor behavior [39, 40], and are
usually not systematically compared to how humans learn new inductive biases [39, 41, 42, 40, 43].
The speed of human learning in our task, paralleled by the model, highlights the importance of
learning rich and flexible structured representations for generalization, either explicitly [24, 44] or
implicitly, as in differentiable neural computers [45] and others [46]. Similar to children acquiring
sophisticated knowledge in a manner bootstrapped by “core” systems of knowledge [47, 48, 49], our
study supports the view that the rapid learning of structured representations can result from appropriate
starting primitives coupled to learning algorithms guided by abstraction and compositionality.
5 Broader Impact
We envision a number of scientific, societal and engineering benefits that may emerge from this study.
First, this work may benefit the treatment, diagnostics, and prevention of cognitive disorders, such as
disorders involving planning, reasoning, and learning. The methodology of our task is particularly
relevant for understand disorders that cause striking impairment in drawing behavior (for example,
dementia, traumatic brain injury, and stroke). A computational understanding of cognitive impairment
may lead to more accurate, quantitative diagnostic tools (by categorizing disorders based on cognitive
computations) and to more efficient targeted treatment (by targeting of specific impairments).
Second, computational understanding of how humans think is scientifically worthwhile, because
it advances our understanding of nature and the human condition. In addition to the current study
of human adults, we are studying this task in human children, and in non-human primates in a
neurophysiological setting, with the goal of also studying this task at a neural level. As the long-term
goal of this multi-species investigation we hope to develop an evolutionary, developmental and
longitudinal understanding of learning of complex structure, as emerging from simple components
and basic computational principles.
Third, from an engineering standpoint, this work may lead to AI that is more easily integrated into,
and more beneficial to society. The ability to learn new human-like inductive biases from a small
number of examples may facilitate human-computer interaction, particularly within programming-
by-examples technologies [50]. Engineering outcomes of this research may also contribute to tools
that benefit education. The link to learning drawing and art is obvious, but there may also exist links
to topics that involve structured symbolic reasoning, such as math, science, or music. For instance,
modeling a given student’s learning trajectory may reveal what she knows and what strategies she
uses to learn, which may suggest ways to either tailor her future learning, or to remedy current
difficulties. Indeed, we also plan to study variants of this task in children.
In principle, work along this line may potentially be used to create “fake” artifacts meant to pass as
human. The most obvious kinds of fake artifacts are those related to drawing, but this extends to
other kinds of art and media, such as internet bots that impersonate humans by generating tweets
from examples. One potential implication is that fakes will be used to confuse and manipulate
society. Ways to address this should fall under strategies and considerations already being developed
to understand the impact of deep-fakes on society. A second implication is that mass-produced AI
artifacts could lower the quality of creative content in the world, and compete with high-quality
human-made creative products. We think of this possibility as an ethical uncertainty, and note that it
is an extension of the apparent already-occurring trend towards larger amounts of mass-produced
media in society.
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